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Stuck between a Rock and a Hard 
Place: Electoral Dilemmas and 
Turnout in the 2002 French 
Legislative Elections 
Thomas Gschwend and Dirk Leuffen 
Introduction 
How does cohabitation affect turnout? Cohabitation has been differently
evoked to explain the outcomes of the 2002 French elections: Whereas
some authors blamed the long cohabitation between President Chirac
and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin for Jean-Marie Le Pen’s success at the
presidential elections (Parodi, 2002), others held the issue of cohabitation
responsible for the outcome of the legislative elections.1 However, the
impact of the issue of cohabitation on election turnout has not been
quantitatively assessed. 
In this chapter we analyse the impact of the issue of cohabitation on
turnout in the French legislative elections 2002. We here treat cohabit-
ation as the French version of divided government2 in order to establish
a comparative perspective, arguing that research on French politics can
profit from theories and findings of general debates in the literature. At
the same time the case of France can stimulate and improve comparative
research on divided government, if at least by pointing out seemingly
counter intuitive phenomena for other political systems. 
Elections are the central link between constituents and representatives.
Through elections, citizens are able to participate in policy-making – for
the most part – indirectly by choosing policymakers. It is the way to hold
politicians accountable. Moreover, competitive elections also establish
a reverse link since elected representatives have to pay attention to
their constituents in order to get re-elected. Understanding why people
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participate in elections is thus one of the core questions in order to
understand the nature of representation, the degree of responsiveness
of a given polity and the functioning of the democratic political process
at large.
By all means, there is already a vast body of literature trying to
explain participation at the polls. By investigating the impact of cohab-
itation on turnout, however, we add a new explanation of abstention.
In a catalogue compiled by Bréchon (1998: 34–40) the author explains
abstention in France with socioeconomic variables, anti-political senti-
ments of the non-voters and a loose compilation of factors comprising
various forms of situative and rationalist forms of non-participation.
Bréchon’s catalogue thus clearly contains most dimensions common in
the political behaviour literature such as Socioeconomic Status (SES)
and alienation from parties and the political system. However, another
dimension that is usually called “abstention from indifference” (also see
Davis et al. 1970: 437; Enelow and Hinich, 1984: 90) is not included in
Bréchon’s catalogue. Abstention from indifference is assumed to occur
when eligible voters are cross-pressured; they feel torn between policy
and common non-policy issues such as candidate characteristics (Enelow
and Hinich, 1984: 80ff.). As an addition to this common understanding
of indifference we argue here that in the 2002 French legislative elec-
tions a large part of voters were confronted with dilemmas resulting from
cross-pressures of policy or partisan and polity, or as we term them here,
regime preferences. We investigate whether in 2002 the question of a
future cohabitation was an issue that cross-pressured individual voters
bringing about electoral indifference and, ultimately, making them
more likely to abstain. 
The chapter is structured in the following manner: We start off by
briefly reviewing the literature on turnout and abstention. We then
develop a theory of abstention from indifference caused by partisan-
regime cross-pressures. Based on this theory we generate two hypotheses
that are tested in a comprehensive turnout model. Besides variables
measuring partisan and regime preferences we also control for trad-
itional explanations of turnout such as SES and alienation in this model.
Our analysis is based on data derived from a survey that we conducted
between the presidential and the legislative elections (Schmitt and
Gschwend 2002). Estimation results and statistical simulations provide
evidence that regime preferences play a decisive role for the decision to
participate in an election. When someone’s regime preferences conflict
with his or her partisan preferences, the probability of abstention was
assumed to rise – in the first round of the 2002 parliamentary election
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this held especially for supporters of the left. Finally, we conclude by
evaluating the impact of cohabitation on turnout in the 2002 French
legislatives and beyond. 
Abstention in France 
The abstention rate of 35.6 per cent in the first round of the 2002 legis-
lative elections just beat the Fifth Republic’s legislatives abstention
record of the year of 1988 that amounted to 34.26 per cent. The growing
abstention rates since the 1970s have given rise to lamentos over the crisis
of representation (Lijphart, 1997) and the ‘dépolitisation des citoyens’.3
Abstention has become one of the most studied fields of electoral
behaviour. In the case of France since Lancelot’s early monograph on
abstention (Lancelot, 1968), various articles have been published on the
subject (Rosenthal and Sen, 1973; Chiche and Dupoirier, 1998; Subileau
and Toinet, 1989; Appleton, 2000). A fine summary on the state of the art
is given by Bréchon (1998: 17–42). In the literature on abstention in France
the authors usually distinguish between non-registration (non-inscription)
and abstention. The estimations on the non-registration rates vary
between about 4 per cent and 11 per cent of the electorate (Appleton,
2000: 210), Bréchon assumes about 10 per cent of non-registration
(Bréchon, 1998: 19). In this chapter we focus on actual abstention. How-
ever, we treat voting ‘blanc et nul’ (blank and invalid) as abstention,
since the indifference structure to be analysed here is assumed to lead to
either of the two behaviours.4 
How is abstention explained for the case of France? Bréchon differen-
tiates between three types of abstention dominant in France: Firstly,
Bréchon explains abstention with social indicators such as low SES,
secondly by anti-political sentiments that imply critical assessments of
the political system as well as the political elites and, thirdly, reasons that
comprise, for example, rational decisions of voters who weigh costs and
benefits of their electoral participation and only vote when they expect
their vote to be decisive. Other examples of non-voters are supporters
who follow their favoured party’s call to abstain, voters who cannot repeat
their first-ballot electoral choice in the second-ballot and feel hostile
towards the remaining candidates (Converse and Pierce, 1986: 344) or
supporters who abstain in second-order elections to give an indirect
wake-up call to their party that currently holds the power (Fauvelle-
Aymar et al. 2000).5 However, an abstention from indifference resulting
from psychological cross-pressured preference orders is not included in
Bréchon’s catalogue of abstention.6 
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Cross-pressures and turnout 
No matter whether you prefer the “Columbia”, “Michigan” or “Rochester”
school, traditional models of voting behaviour agree that voters are
likely to vote for the party they like most. Although they have different
models of an individual’s decision-making process they assume that
voters are able to form partisan preferences that helps them to decide
whether they go to the polls and for which party they are going to
vote. Thus, a partisan preference is a major yardstick that helps them to
come to grips with their vote-choice decision. What happens, though, if
voters’ partisan preferences cannot be of any help to them because
voters feel cross-pressured, that is, they feel torn between two or more
parties? 
Lazarsfeld et al. can be considered the pioneers of the effect of cross-
pressures on partisan preference and voting behaviour in general
(Lazarsfeld et al. 1948: 53, 60, 61). For Lazarsfeld et al. cross-pressures
are “conflicts and inconsistencies among the factors which influence
vote decision. [ . . . ] cross pressures upon the voter drive him in opposite
directions” (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948: 53). The sources of this kind of cross-
pressures stem from the combination of conflicting sociological factors.
Campbell etal. use the term cross-pressure to refer to an attitude conflict
bearing on the individual (Campbell etal. 1960: 80). For them the degree
of attitude consistency determines not only the time when an individual
finally reaches a firm vote intention, but they also suspect that cross-
pressures arising from inconsistent attitude objects are likely to reduce
the probability of turnout (Campbell et al. 1960: 83). In rational choice
approaches, which centre on individual utility-maximising strategies as
a decision criterion, a theory of abstention from indifference has been
elaborated in more depth (Davis etal. 1970; Riker and Ordeshook, 1973;
Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Thurner and Eymann, 2000). In spatial models
of voting behaviour abstention from indifference occurs when two
parties or candidates have the same Euclidian distance from the voter’s
ideal point and (s)he therefore may abstain from voting “because it
simply does not make much difference to him who wins” (Enelow and
Hinich, 1984: 90).7 
What if voters employ various utility functions? Or similarly: what if
voters not only form partisan preferences but also form preferences about
the consequences of an election on the type or structure of government?
Do voters form regime preferences, that is, do they prefer unified over
divided government or vice versa, and cast their vote accordingly to let
their vote choice reflect their regime preferences?8 If voters form regime
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preferences, then these preferences should influence their decision-
making process as well.9 
The election campaigns made the cohabitation issue highly salient.10
Many commentators blamed the cohabitation issue for the election
outcome. The structure of the two sets of two elections also potentially
enabled what might be called regime concerned voting behaviour. Voting
behaviour is regime concerned, when individuals integrate the expected
regime implications of their vote choice into their decision calculus.11 
How can regime preferences play out in the super election year of
2002 such that partisan and regime preferences stay in conflict with
one another? Right before the first round of the parliamentary election
in June of 2002 voters clearly knew that Chirac was re-elected President
and which regime implications their legislative vote choices had12:
Following a bipolar understanding of French politics a vote choice for
the moderate right increased the probability of a return to unified
government, while a vote choice for the left increased the probability
of another cohabitation. However, this particular structure of elec-
tions, that is, the reduction of presidential term of office to five years
and the modification of the electoral calendar will probably become
the rule, can augment dilemmas for voters. Voters may have contrast-
ing partisan and regime preferences that they might integrate into
their decision-making process. In 2002 when an eligible voter at the
same time supported a party of the left and a unified government he
or she faced such a cross-pressure situation. A similar dilemma, of course,
applied for a supporter of the right who actually favoured divided
government.13 
How do voters solve such cross-pressure dilemmas? Voters could either
cast their vote in accordance with their partisan preferences or cast a
vote that reflects their regime preferences. Alternatively they may decide
to abstain altogether. When partisan and regime preferences neutralise
one another, the voter might resolve the resulting cross-pressure situation
by abstaining from the election. 
The following two hypotheses sum up these considerations: 
1. Supporters of the left preferring unified government (i.e. partisan
and regime preferences are conflicting) are more likely to abstain
than supporters of the left who prefer divided government. 
2. Supporters of the right preferring divided government (i.e. partisan
and regime preferences are conflicting) are more likely to abstain
than supporters of the right who prefer unified government. 
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Operationalisation 
The data we analyse here comes from a survey conducted between the
second round of the presidential elections and the first round of the
elections for the Assemblée nationale.14 The respondents thus knew that
Jacques Chirac was re-elected as President. 
Our dependent variable, turnout at the first round of the legislatives,
is dichotomously scoring one if the respondent intends to vote for a
particular party candidate and zero otherwise including casting an
invalid or blank ballot. To investigate the impact of regime preferences
on turnout15 we first had to identify a voter’s attitude towards cohabit-
ation. For this we used the following item: 
«S’agissant d’une éventuelle future cohabitation, de quelle opinion
vous sentez-vous le plus proche?»16 
Then, respondents were presented the following alternatives: (a) « une
cohabitation serait une bonne chose pour la France », or (b) «une cohabitation
serait une mauvaise chose pour la France ».17 
How do respondents generate an answer to such a question? From
research on the survey response, we know that voters simply make one
up if they have no ready-made answer they could provide (Zaller, 1992;
Zaller and Feldman, 1992). To make-up an answer, it is likely that
respondents in an interview situation encode this question purely in
a partisan way since they are likely to have at least some kind of partisan
orientation to draw on. Encoded in this manner and given the outcome
of the presidentielles, leftists should therefore favour cohabitation while
voters on the right should consequently oppose cohabitation. A purely
partisan interpretation of the issue, however, can be neglected for the
group that we are primarily interested in, which are the eligible voters
who express contrasting regime and partisan preferences. 
Our hypotheses predict that if voters’ partisan and regime preferences
are conflicting, then they are more likely to abstain than voters where
partisan and regime preferences are in line. Thus besides voters’ attitudes
towards cohabitation we need to measure their partisan preferences
as well. 
We derive every respondent’s partisan preference order from standard
10-point party likes/dislikes scales to find out his or her most preferred
party. Supporters of the political right are coded 1 if they most prefer
a party of the political right, such as Union pour la démocracie française
(UDF), Rassemblement pour la république (RPR) or Démocratie liberale
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(DL).18 Analogously, supporters of the political left are coded 1 if they
most prefer a party of the left, such as Parti socialiste (PS), the Greens,
Parti communiste français (PCF) or Mouvement des citoyens (MDC).19 The
excluded category, thus, consists of respondents who most prefer parties
of the extreme left and right.20 All together we have likes/dislikes scales
for nine parties including all parties above as well as Front national (FN)
(extreme right) and Lutte ouvrière (LO) (extreme left). We will not engage
in the debate on whether left–right ideological attachment or party iden-
tification should be used as political anchor in France (Converse and
Pierce, 1993; Fleury and Lewis-Beck, 1993a,b; Fauvelle-Aymar et al. 2000:
398). Instead, in addition to party preferences we also control for ideo-
logical self-placement in order to determine broadly where a voter is
anchored into the political realm. Ideology is measured as respondent’s
self-placement on 11-point left/right scale recoded to a 0 to 1 scale where
higher values reflect a self-placement further on the right. 
In order to test our main hypotheses we construct two dummy vari-
ables indicating whether or not partisan and regime preferences are con-
flicting. Thus supporters of the left score 1 on the ‘regime-left’ dummy
if they oppose cohabitation and supporters of the right score 1 on the
‘regime-right’ dummy if they favour cohabitation. Thus we expect both
dummies to be significantly negative since voters faced with this cross-
pressure situation should be less likely to turnout. In our sample we find
that about 15 per cent of the supporters of the right favour cohabitation,
that is, they report polity preferences that stay in contrast with their
partisan preferences. For supporters of the left the respective number is
even higher. Here almost every third supporter of the left reports a polity
preference that cross-pressures his or her partisan preference. Moreover,
every fourth respondent that plans to abstain faces such a cross-pressure
situation. These people are on average slightly higher educated and place
themselves ideologically more to the left than the average respondent
in our sample. 
Our main hypotheses are geared towards explaining turnout at the
individual level that should operate above and beyond well-known and
often replicated findings about hypothetical causal mechanisms that
predict turnout. It is important to control for these alternative causal
mechanisms in order to establish that there is a specific cross-pressure
effect on turnout and separate it out from the effects of the remaining
variables to assess the particular strength of this cross-pressure effect on
turnout (Gschwend, 2003). Following Brèchon’s (1998) typology of
abstention in France, we control for alternative hypotheses by including
the following variables in our model. First, to control for socioeconomic
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status of the respondent we include the respondent’s age (ranging from
18 to 84 in our sample) in our model as well as 0 to 1 scales for education
and income.21 We refer to the Appendix for the exact coding. 
Second, in order to account for the anti-political dimension that is
thought to partly explain turnout behaviour we include measures for
partisan alienation, political interest and political efficacy. Partisan alien-
ation refers to the feeling of minimal connection to one’s most pre-
ferred party.22 We measure the intensity of that feeling by the difference
of a respondent’s placement of his or her most preferred party from the
theoretical maximum value (i.e., 10) on the party likes/dislikes scale
and recode it to a 0 to 1 scale. Political interest is known to have an
impact on an individual’s decision to participate in the election (Lazarsfeld
et al. 1948: 47; Campbell etal. 1960: 102; Lancelot, 1968: 162–167; Verba
and Nie, 1972). We measure it subjectively by a respondent’s self-
placement on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (“not at all interested”) to
1 (“very interested”). Finally, starting with Campbell et al. (1954: 187)
the political behaviour literature suggests that political efficacy is also
a strong predictor of turnout. We construct an additive political efficacy
index, reflecting a respondent’s subjective perception of political com-
petence to influence the political system, based on four efficacy-items
to control for that. We refer to the appendix for the exact wording.23 
Third, in order to account for the election-specific dimension, we
measure the impact of abstention from indifference. As we have argued,
indifference can arise not only because respondents feel cross-pressured
given their policy preferences, something the current literature suggests,
we additionally propose that abstention from indifference might occur
because a voter’s partisan and regime preferences are conflicting. We
assume that respondents’ policy preferences as well as the importance
they attribute to various policies colour their partisan lenses with which
they perceive the political realm. At the same time respondents’ partisan
preferences reflect to some degree their policy preferences. Parties, in
such a respect, can thus to some degree be perceived as policy bundles.
Therefore indifferent partisans most prefer a party of the left and of the
right at the same time. Hence, we construct a dummy for the group with
indifferent partisan preferences. Respondents are coded 1 if they have tied
both, a party of the left and the right, on the first rank and 0 otherwise.24 
Cohabitation turns me out? 
In order to test our two hypotheses and asses their substantive impact
on the decision to turnout, controlling for rival or complementing
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hypotheses, we estimate a logit model. The coefficient estimates are
presented in Table 9.1 whereby the last two independent variables are
the key variables to test our hypotheses. 
Overall, the fit of our turnout model is excellent. Based on this model
we correctly predict more than nine out of ten respondents. A naive
guess that everyone would turn out given the skewed distribution of the
dependent variable would allow one to predict turnout with 91.6 per cent
accuracy. Our model yields after all an 8.5 per cent reduction in error over
this baseline naive guess.25 The message of the results is unambiguous.
The universe of possible explanations of turnout is clearly multidimen-
sional. The anti-political dimension seems to be the main dimension
that is able to explain turnout in France. It might be surprising to some
observers of French politics but the SES dimension does not contribute
above and beyond the anti-political as well as conjectural dimensions
to an explanation of turnout. We find that quite comforting because it
shows that a political act like turnout seems to be best explained by
Table 9.1 A logit model predicting turnout at the first round of the legislative
elections    
Note: p-values are for two-tailed tests based on robust (White–Huber) standard errors.
Independent variables Coef. Std. Err. p 
Constant 0.871 0.923 0.345 
SES dimension   
Age 0.020 0.011 0.072 
Education 0.089 0.638 0.889 
Income −1.238 0.929 0.183 
Anti-political dimension   
Alienation −3.143 0.815 0.000
Political Interest 2.135 0.760 0.005 
Political Efficacy 3.080 0.866 0.000 
Conjuctural dimension   
Indifference −0.675 0.602 0.262 
Ideology −0.506 0.725 0.485 
Right −0.341 0.575 0.554 
Left 0.157 0.589 0.789 
Regime-Right 1.325 1.071 0.216 
Regime-Left −0.946 0.440 0.031 
N 705   
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.235   
Percent reduction in error 8.5   
Percent correctly predicted 92.3   
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political and attitudinal variables instead of coarse social characteristics.
There might be possible conditional effects of SES factors on turnout
that we have not specified here but there are no significant main effects
of any conceivable SES variable on turnout, although age comes close.
All three indicators of the anti-political dimension – alienation, political
interests as well as political efficacy – on the other hand, as expected,
exert a significant effect on turnout, confirming prior work on this
topic. 
The main interest of this analysis is, however, to assess the impact of
the conjectural dimension on turnout. Does this dimension contribute
to the explanation of turnout? It seems that voters that are indifferent
between a party of the left and a party of the right are not significantly
more likely to abstain than to turn out. Thus abstention seems to be no
typical way out of this dilemma for respondents with indifferent partisan
preferences.26 
If we focus merely on whether respondents are anchored on the left
or the right of the political spectrum whereby their polity preferences
are in line with their partisan preferences (measured by the “Right” and
“Left” dummy), as expected, our results do not provide evidence that
such respondents are systematically more likely to turn out or to abstain.
However, if respondents feel cross-pressured because they prefer on
the one hand a party of the left but on the other hand prefer unified
over divided government, as the “Regime-Left” dummy indicates, such
respondents are systematically less likely to go to the polls. For such
respondents abstention seems to be a way out of this cross-pressure situ-
ation – a finding that confirms our first hypothesis. We cannot confirm
our second hypothesis, though, since respondents who prefer a party
on the right and prefer divided government are not systematically
different in their propensity to participate than supporters of the right
who favour unified government. Thus, attitudes towards cohabitation
seem to exert significant cross-pressures only for supporters of the left. 
Why is that? We think there are at least two explanations responsible
for producing this asymmetry. First, we have the campaign strategy of
the left demonising cohabitation early on and thereby making this issue
stick with their electorate. Of course, the left run into problems with such
a strategy after loosing the presidentielles. Thus the discourse against
cohabitation to persuade the public that France needs to restore a coher-
ent executive is likely to produce more cross-pressures on the left than
the right. This can only be part of an explanation since the cross-pressures
on the right are not simply weaker but essentially inexistent. Thus,
there has to be a second explanation. Imagine a supporter of the right
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preferring cohabitation because this supporter supposedly favours check-
ing power and balancing policy over a coherent executive. But who
should be elected to check power? The left is not really a strong and
unified counterpart going into the parliamentary elections and without
a charismatic leader it is hard to foresee what kind of balance such
a supporter would get. Given the strong showing of Le Pen, a unified
government might not be the preferred option but is still a better
option than having a strong extreme right in parliament. Thus, rather
than abstaining, such supporters do actually turnout overcoming their
cross-pressures and, conceivably, also trying to minimise the impact of
the extremists, too. 
Nevertheless, based on our data, abstention by indifference seems to
be relevant not merely when respondents feel cross-pressured given
their policy preferences, something the literature suggests, but rather
when respondents’ clear partisan and polity preferences are not in line
with one another. Our results show that abstention by indifference
need not be simply a partisan or policy cross-pressure effect. In order to
become politically relevant, abstention by indifference has to be associ-
ated with a feeling of being torn between policy (or partisan) and polity
(or regime) preferences that create cross-pressures. Thus, in addition to
partisan indifference, we argue that particular cross-pressure situations
might drive voters to abstain. In the case of the 2002 elections they
abstain not because they are indifferent between parties but rather
because their partisan and regime preferences are conflicting. 
How strong are these cross-pressure effects compared to other effects?
Since a logit model is non-linear and non-additive, the substantive
interpretation of these coefficients is not straightforward. The effects of
estimated coefficients depend upon values of the other variables and
coefficients. To take full advantage of the information available in these
estimation results we run some statistical simulations to compute quan-
tities of substantive interest based on these coefficients.27 One way to
assess the substantive impact is through “first differences” (King et al.
2000). The idea behind this is to compare the predicted likelihood of
turnout of two hypothetical voters who only differ in a characteristic of
interest. The difference of the model predictions between these two
hypothetical voters represents the substantive impact of this character-
istic. So let us define two hypothetical respondents that most prefer
a party of the left. Lets assume that both respondents are no different
from the average French respondent in our survey in terms of their
characteristics on both, the SES as well as the anti-political dimensions.
We purposefully let them differ in their attitudes towards cohabitation,
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though. One of them favours divided government, that is, regime pre-
ferences are in line with partisan preferences. The simulations reveal
that such a respondent has a probability of about 97 per cent to actually
turn out at the first round of the legislatives. The other hypothetical
respondent opposes divided government and consequently has to deal
with this cross-pressure situation. His or her predicted probability to
actually turn out drops to about 92 percent. Thus, having to deal with
such a cross-pressure situation between partisan and regime preferences
reduces the predicted probability of going to the polls of an otherwise
average supporter of the left by about 5 percentage points. This finding
has profound consequences for the designing of election campaigns. From
this perspective it becomes clear why the campaign managers of the
right framed the legislatives as anti-cohabitation elections after winning
the presidency. Besides mobilising their own electorate focussing the
issue of cohabitation and highlighting its consequences on vote choice,
if not persuading to switch sides, it, at least, induces cross-pressures for
supporters of the left that can be convinced that cohabitation is a bad
idea for France. This was likely to prove successful for supporters of the
left as targeted audience since the left had come out against cohabitation
early on (Chiroux, 2001a: 94; Schrameck, 2001: 23). Thus, campaigning
on this issue seems to demobilise supporters of the left if their regime
and partisan preferences are not in line with one another. This might be
all the more consequential, of course, when the lower the respondent’s
political efficacy or political interest is or the more alienated the respo-
ndent feels from the political parties. Given lower than average values
on the efficacy or interest scales (or higher than average values on the
alienation scale) the cross-pressures from conflicting partisan and regime
preferences might be already enough to tip the see-saw to the absten-
tion side. 
We, again, use some statistical simulations that allow us to be more
precise about the magnitude of this cross-pressure effect and the condi-
tions that might drive an otherwise average voter into abstention. In
order to do that we simulate the predicted probability of two classes of
hypothetical voters. These voters have an average value on the ideology
scale and the same socioeconomic status throughout. Their values on
age, income and education are set to the sample mean.28 Moreover,
since the cross-pressure effect is anti-symmetric and only applies to
supporters of the left, we simulate only the probability to turn out for
supporters of the left. For the first class of voters, we assume that their
regime preferences are in line with their partisan preference, that is,
they prefer cohabitation while for the second class we assume that they
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face partisan-regime cross-pressure effects. Finally, we generate predicted
probabilities for both classes of supporters of the left conditional on
characteristics of the anti-political dimension. In Figure 9.1 we plot
these probabilities if we move all three variables of this dimension –
political efficacy, political interest and alienation (more precisely:
1-alienation) – simultaneously from their minimum (at 0) to their
maximum (at 1). 
These simulations make transparent the nature of the cross-pressure
effect for average supporters of the left. Across the entire range of
efficacy, interest as well as alienation the probability to turn out for
supporters of the left is lower when partisan and regime preferences
conflict. Values above the 50 per cent reference line indicate that our
model predicts that these supporters of the left will actually turn out
while for supporters that fall below that line we predict that they will
abstain. While there is not much of a difference for supporters of the
left if they score either very high or very low on efficacy, interest and
alienation the cross-pressure effect resulting from conflicting regime and
partisan preferences becomes in fact consequential for tipping the see-saw
to the abstention side. From the above graph we can see that for an




















Figure 9.1 Cross-pressure effect for supporters of the Left. 
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efficacy and interest scale and scoring 0.65 (=1−0.35) and 0.75 (1−0.25)
on the alienation scale it makes a substantive difference in their
decision-making process whether to go to the polls. If such voters get
persuaded that cohabitation is a bad idea for France they feel cross-
pressured enough to be demobilised. The consequence is that they will
no longer turnout. 
How strong does this partisan-regime cross-pressure effect actually
get? Since we model the decision to turn out at the polls as a logit
model, this effect is non-linear by design. The magnitude of this effect
is conditional on all other independent variables in the model. Figure 9.2
provides an overview about the magnitude of these effects. 
The magnitude of this effect is the difference in predicted probability
to turn out between the two classes of supporters of the left, that is, the
predicted probability of the no cross-pressure class minus the one of
the class facing this cross-pressure situation. Given certain values of the
independent variables this effect can be substantially strong. Based on
the scenario we defined in our simulations above we find that the dif-
ference in predicted probability for two average supporters of the left































Figure 9.2 How strong is the cross-pressure effect on the probability to turnout? 
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than 10 percentage points. In general we can see that the cross-pressure
effect seems to be much more consequential for supporters of the left
that score low on efficacy and interest, and high on alienation. The
effect rapidly decreases for values of efficacy and interest above 0.5 (and
below 0.5 for alienation). Apparently, supporters of the left that are
high in efficacy and have a strong interest in politics but are not
strongly alienated from the political parties seem to be better equipped
to deal with the indifference between their partisan and regime prefer-
ences such that they are able to decide that they turn out – no matter
what. Since the cost of casting a ballot for a candidate of the political
right might be too high, abstention seems to be a systematic way out,
particularly for supporters of the left that face such a cross-pressure
situation. Thus regime preferences do have a substantive impact on a
voter’s decision to turn out at the polls that can complement well-known
rival explanations. 
To be sure, all the factors describing the anti-political dimension of
the universe of explanations have an even greater impact on an individ-
ual’s decision-making process to turn out. For an otherwise average
respondent (all other variables are set to their sample mean) the predicted
probability based on our turnout model decreases by about 11 percentage
points if political interest decreases from its maximum to its minimum.
The substantive impact of political efficacy and alienation is even stronger.
Compared to an otherwise average respondent high in political efficacy,
an average voter low in political efficacy is almost 24 percentage points
less likely to turn out. The difference between average respondents who
are high and low alienated is 31 percentage points. Partisan alienation,
thus, exerts the strongest effect in our model. 
To sum up, regime preferences have predictable implications on
a voter’s decision-making process. The impact of regime preferences on
a voter’s decision to turn out does have a substantive impact for
supporters of the left as hypothesised, if their attitudes toward cohabit-
ation stay in conflict to their partisan preferences. Although this effect
is not stronger than the ones from the anti-political dimension, the
partisan-regime cross-pressure effect, in fact, does operate in addition
to them. Moreover, since these cross-pressures affect turnout asymmetric-
ally, abstention has important consequences on the outcome of
the election (Fauvelle-Aymar et al. 2000: 398). Thus, the cross-pressure
effect we identify is not only of theoretical interest but also becomes
substantively meaningful given its magnitude for a particular segment
of partisans of the left whose partisan and regime preferences are
conflicting. 
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Conclusion 
The universe of explanations of turnout is clearly multidimensional.
Consistent with prior research in the political behaviour literature on
turnout, we find that factors like political efficacy, political interest and
low alienation strongly predict turnout. Socioeconomic factors, however,
do not add much explanatory power above and beyond efficacy, interest
and alienation. 
Based on assumptions that conflicting partisan and regime preferences
exert cross-pressures we expected that it is more likely for eligible voters
to abstain if their partisan and regime preferences stay in contrast to
one another than for those voters whose partisan and regime preferences
are consistent, that is, they pull the voter in the same direction. Con-
trolling for various rival explanations we find evidence supporting these
hypotheses for supporters of the left. Supporters of the left preferring
unified government are more likely to abstain than supporters of the
left preferring cohabitation. However, we could not find an equivalent
effect for supporters of the right. Thus supporters of the right preferring
cohabitation are not more likely to abstain than supporters of the right
preferring unified government. Abstention from indifference based on
conflicting partisan and regime preferences yields an asymmetric cross-
pressure effect in favour of the political right since supporters of the left
got demobilised. 
Does this come as a surprise? On the one hand, the political leaders of
the left had declared for a long time that cohabitation would damage
the Republic’s institutions. It was very difficult for the left to change
their discourse after their failure at the presidential election and to
actually praise the advantages of a future cohabitation. Certain attempts,
in fact, lacked credibility. On the other hand, the left was presumably
not perceived strong and unified enough for supporters of the right to
let their regime preferences play out strongly if they prefer cohabitation
despite their partisan preferences. Thus it is likely that regime preferences
of these supporters of the right have not been a credible alternative
decision criterion. Consequently there is no cross-pressure situation if
the implications of their regime preferences are not strong enough to
stay in conflict with their partisan preferences. Even if some supporters of
the right felt cross-pressured overcoming them, it has the added bonus
that it also minimises the success of the extreme right in the parliamentary
elections as well. 
In single-member district systems parties’ mobilisation capacity can
be decisive for the electoral outcomes (Dolez, 2002). In competitive
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races, since the winner takes it all, mobilisation of just a few per cent of
voters can play a decisive role. Our simulations show that the cross-
pressure effects from holding regime and partisan preferences that are
not in line with one another are strongest for voters with below average
values on political efficacy and interest as well as above average values
on the alienation scale. In order to study these effects for the outcome
of the election we suspect that abstention caused by these cross-pressure
effects might be much more consequential in certain constituencies
than in others. In order to assess the electoral impact of this type of
abstention we need to classify in future research constituencies with
voters exerting high and low levels of political efficacy, alienation and
political interest. Supposedly, in a bourgeois suburb of Paris we should
find less impact of this type of abstention on the local election outcome
than in socially more heterogeneous constituencies. Additionally, future
research on this type of abstention is necessary, particularly in other
political systems as well. The 2002 US midterm elections, for instance,
seem to be a suitable case.
From a normative point of view the type of abstention that we detect
in this chapter does not seem particularly problematic to us. Abstention
from indifference based on individual psychological conflicts is not
necessarily an indicator of a citizens ‘dépolitisation’ or a crisis of the
political system.   
Appendix 
Income (rescaled 0 to 1) 
1. moins de 2000 francs/moins de 305 € 
2. De 2001 à 3000 francs/de 305 à 457 € 
3. De 3001 à 5000 francs/de 458 à 762 € 
4. De 5001 à 7500 francs/de 763 à 1.143 € 
5. De 7501 à 10.000 francs/de 1.144 à 1.524 € 
6. De 10.001 à 15.000 francs/de 1.525 à 2.286 € 
7. De 15.001 à 20.000 francs/de 2.287 à 3.048 € 
8. De 20.001 à 30.000 francs/de 3.049 à 4.573 € 
9. De 30.001 à 40.000 francs/de 4.574 à 6.097 € 
10. De 40.001 à 50.000 francs/de 6.098 à 7.622 € 
11. 50.001 francs et plus/7.623 € et plus 
Education (rescaled 0 to 1) 
1. Sans diplôme 
2. ertificat d’études primaires 
3. Ancien brevet, BEPC 
4. Certificat d’aptitude professionnel (CAP) 
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5. Brevet d’enseignement professionnel (BEP) 
6. BAC d’enseignement technique 
7. BAC d’enseignement général 
8. BAC + 2 ou niveau BAC + 2 ans (DUT, BTS, instituteurs, DEUG) 
9. Diplôme universitaire de l’enseignement supérieur(2è, 3è cycles) 
10. Grandes Ecoles/Ecole d’Ingénieurs 
Political Efficacy Scale: 4 Items 
1. Dans l’ensemble, êtes-vous très satisfait, assez satisfait, peu satisfait ou pas du
tout satisfait du fonctionnement de la démocratie en France ? (4-point scale) 
2. Certaines personnes disent “qu’il y a une différence selon celui qui est au
pouvoir”. D’autres disent “qu’il n’y a aucune différence quel que soit celui
qui est au pouvoir”. Vous même, où vous situeriez vous sur une échelle de 1
à 5 où le chiffre 1 signifie “il y une différence selon celui qui est au pouvoir”
et le chiffre 5 signifie “il n’y a aucune différence quel que soit celui qui est
au pouvoir”? (5-point scale) 
3. Certaines personnes pensent que ce qu’on vote ne change rien. D’autres
pensent que ce qu’on vote peut faire changer les choses. Où vous situez-vous
sur une échelle de 1 à 5 où le chiffre 1 signifie “ce qu’on vote ne change rien”
et le chiffre 5 signifie “ce qu’on vote peut faire changer les choses”? (5-point
scale) 
4. Etes-vous tout à fait d’accord, plutôt d’accord, plutôt pas d’accord ou pas
du tout d’accord avec la proposition suivante: La démocratie a peut-être des
défauts mais elle est meilleure que les autres formes de gouvernement.
(4-point scale) 
Notes 
The authors wish to thank Mike Lewis-Beck, Hermann Schmitt, Barbara
Schaan, Stefan Seidendorf and the MZES working group on French politics for
helpful suggestions and comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1. For example, Laurent Fabius in an interview with Le Nouvel Observateur of 11th
July 2002 speaks of a “défaite des legislatives en juin par rejet de la cohabit-
ation” (see also Cole 2002, 335). 
2. This view is supported for example by Elgie (2001), Shugart (1995) and Alesina
and Rosenthal (1995). For a different assessment, see Pierce (1991). In this
chapter, moments of executive coherence are respectively considered as unified
government. We neither consider coalition governments nor the so-called
informal cohabitation between President Giscard d’Estaing and Prime Minister
Jacques Chirac as examples of divided government (Sundquist 1988; Laver
and Shepsle 1991). 
3. Chiche et al. give an account of this literature on France (Chiche et al. 1992:
166–174). 
4. Voting blank in this respect can be considered an ‘abstention civique’
(Bréchon, 1998: 40). The error or invalidity component of ‘blanc et nul’ does
not concern us here since we analyse respondent’s voting intentions. 
5. Bréchon finds that systematic abstention, that is, that a citizen always abstains
across all sorts of elections, is rather exceptional (Bréchon, 1998: 39). Systematic
abstention is usually explained by SES and anti-political reasons. 
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6. Nevertheless, there is a hint about the possibility of neutralising cross-pressures
in his chapter on the ‘blanc et nul’ vote (Bréchon 1998: 40). 
7. On rational choice and turnout more generally, compare Aldrich (1993). 
8. We follow Sartori who has argued that the Fifth Republic oscillates between
the two poles of presidential and parliamentary regime characteristics (Sartori,
1994: 123). Whereas during cohabitation the parliamentary logic prevails, during
the periods of unified government a presidential reading of the constitution
is dominant. We understand regime voting as an umbrella term, comprising
a voting behaviour that alternatively favours unified or divided government
(Gschwend and Leuffen, 2003). 
9. Since the late 1980s, authors like Fiorina (1991), Jacobson (1990), Wattenberg
(1991), Sigelman etal. (1997), have been investigating the electoral origins
of divided government. However, the systemic turn of voting theory has rarely
been transformed to the interpretation of unified government election outcomes.
10. Interestingly, it was the Socialist Party that started to frame the elections as
a return to unified government. As early as in January 2000 Lionel Jospin at
the Congress of Grenoble expressed his desire that the Frenchmen would
restore a coherent executive (Chiroux, 2001a: 94). Another early expression
of this idea can be found in Olivier Schrameck’s famous ‘Matignon – Rive
gauche’ (Schrameck, 2001: 23). After President Chirac’s re-election his sup-
porting camp, the Union pour la majorité présidentielle (UMP) is reported to have
centred its campaign strongly on the cohabitation issue (Bell and Criddle,
2002: 656, 657; Libération, 4th June 2002). 
11. We are not the first ones, to be sure, that discuss potential consequences of
feeling cross-pressured between two different preference orders that typically
facilitate an individual’s decision-making process. Boy and Dupoirier have
discussed cross-pressure situations for the case of France and identify voters
that are subject to them (1993: 157). For these voters “the forces that affect
behaviour would tend to cancel one another out” (Boy and Dupoirier, 1993:
157). Boy and Dupoirier speculate that the effects of such cross-pressures
could further abstention. They, however, find the cross-pressure issue difficult
to operationalise. 
12. The time lag seems too small to expect massive occurrence of negative voting.
However, it is evident that Chirac’s enormous success at the presidential
elections does not reflect his popularity and that the legislative election result
cannot just be explained by his personal pulling power. Thus the coat-tail
mechanisms that link the two sets of elections are not as evident as might
seem from a short glance at the results. 
13. The support for divided government has only recently declined (Grunberg,
1999; Chiroux, 2001b). A rapid decline of public opinion towards cohabitation
can be seen when comparing the Louis Harris polling results on cohabitation
published in Libération on 7th March with the ones published on 29th
March 2002. This change of opinion, however, might not last for long and
even in our data on 2002 some supporters of the right expressed sympathies
for a future cohabitation. 
14. We used the French Inter-election Survey 2002 – The French CSES II Study
(Schmitt and Gschwend, 2002), administered by CSA, Paris. 
15. Abstention is usually difficult to measure within survey research since only
few people admit their intention not to vote. For example, in our survey
0333_994191_13_cha09.fm  Page 173  Thursday, September 11, 2003  5:44 PM
174 Stuck between a Rock and a Hard Place
only about 8.4 per cent of respondent’s expressed their intention to abstain
or to vote ‘blanc’. To repeat, the actual turnout rate at the first round of
elections was 35.6 per cent.
16. Considering a possible future cohabitation, to which of these opinions do
you feel closer? 
17. (a) Cohabitation is good for France; (b) Cohabitation is bad for France. 
18. When the survey was designed the development of the UMP was not evident
and we expected that voters still use familiar party labels as their political
referents. 
19. Respondents might also most prefer a party of the left and of the right at the
same time. We interpret this as a sign of indifference. See p.xx. 
20. Even if a respondent most prefers a moderate (left or right) and an extreme
party at the same time, he or she is coded as an extremist. Based on respondent’s
placement of parties on the 10-point likes/dislikes scale we divide up the
electorate into 51 per cent supporters of the left, 31 per cent supporters of
the right, 8 per cent extremists, and 10 per cent respondents without clear
partisan preferences. 
21. On the issue of voting behaviour of young voters in the 2002 elections,
compare Muxel (2002). 
22. The intensity of partisan preferences has long been considered a strong
predictor of electoral participation (Campbell et al. 1960: 97). 
23. These four efficacy items have an average inter-item correlation of 0.22 and the
additive scale has an alpha reliability of 0.52. 
24. Other reasons of abstention are difficult to operationalise since with our
data we can neither focus on abstentions longitudinally nor does it permit
to deeply investigate into local structures and the nature of the electoral
competition at the constituency level. Since we are requesting the vote inten-
tion for the first round, the incentives for certain types of strategic abstention
are supposedly absent. 
25. We predict every sixth abstainer correctly, which is quite good given the
skewed distribution of the dependent variable. 
26. Based on a vote-choice model presented elsewhere (Gschwend and Leuffen,
2003), we show that unanchored respondents with indifferent partisan
preferences are more likely to end-up on the bandwagon and voting for the
right. 
27. We use CLARIFY (Tomz et al. 2001), a set of Stata ado-files, to carry out these
simulations. 
28. Thus, we fix ideology at 0.5, age at 44.5 years, education at 0.52 and income
at 0.5. 
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